OUTSIDE POWERS' POLICY
Dr Srdja Trifkovic
Seminar of the Forum on former Yugoslavia "Carrot and Stick?"
Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildung Baden-Wurttemberg
Bad Urach, 2-4 February 1996
1. Dayton, three months later
Let us proceed from the particular to the general: from the faults and
weaknesses of Dayton to the agenda of the present Washington Administration
and other major players in South-East Europe.
First and foremost, the Dayton accord does not address fundamental
issues of sovereignty and ethnic self-determination, which remain the
fundamental cause of war itself. Instead, it bypasses unresolved issues and
creates an elaborate power-sharing agreement for a Bosnian central
govemment. The rationale for this approach is unclear, and its weaknesses
hardly need stating:
"It will be difficult for a contrived central government to replace the
bonds
of loyalty, authority, and legitimacy that currently exist between
Bosnian
Croats and Croatia and Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. These bonds are
rooted in centuries of political, ethnic, and cultural identity and are
sure
to prove stronger than bonds to a hastily fabricated central
government."(1)
The fundamental flow of Dayton is that it is an imposed peace, which
has not grown "organically".* Instead of aiming at conflict resolution, it is
an
exercise in conflict management. It seeks to turn chimera into reality (the
Muslim-Croat "federation"), and to reduce reality to a mere shadow (the Republic
of Srpska). The entire accord is predicated on the assumption that the Muslim-
Croat "federation" is a viable political entity which will continue to grow in
cohesiveness as a counterweight to the Republic of Srpska.
In reality, this phantom edifice is an artificial product of a
U.S.-brokered
marriage of convenience (or shotgun wedding). Before it was formed in 1994, the
Croats and Muslims fought a brutal war, and recent events in Mostar indicate
that the
seeds of this conflict are still in place. This fact contains an inherent
danger: aware that
the "federation" will disintegrate as soon as there is no active anti-Serb
agenda
to hold it together, its creators may be tempted to keep such agenda firmly in
place.
While upholding the "federation", Dayton has effectively destroyed the
Bosnian-Serb Republic. Undoubtedly, the Bosnian Serbs had always accepted
that they would eventually have to trade land for peace, that is, to give up a
lot
of territory in order to enjoy a lot of self-rule. In Dayton, however, they were
given the worst of both worlds. Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic - a man
unelected by the Bosnian-Serbs and self-avowedly disinterested in their future -
has agreed to a territorial settlement which is seen by the Bosnian Serbs as
utterly disastrous.**
At the same time, the constitutional package imposed in Dayton
means that the Bosnian-Serb republic (RS) will be that only in name, whereas
in substance it will be reduced to the level of an autonomous province. The
responsibilities of the central authority - the Muslim government in Sarajevo -
will be far more extensive than anyone had expected: from single currency and
customs to foreign aid and credits, diplomacy and immigration. (Some would
claim that this is an intrinsically desirable outcome, and that curtailing Serb
aspirations to self-rule is what this war - and Western involvement - is all
about;
such sentiments should be made explicit, though.)
___________________________
Footnotes, p. 1:
* This fact has gloomy historical precedents. In 1964, international negotiators
exacted a similar agreement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As Heritage
analysts point out, the doomed Cyprus accord also attempted to replace bonds to
the
"parent entities" for both sides (Greece and Turkey) with an unworkable central
executive and ethnically aligned parliamentary blocs. This structure also never
addressed the fundamental fears and aspirations of the warring factions, and was
predicated on a diplomatic fantasy: hopes for a degree of cooperation that had
never
been present in Cyprus. After ten years of chronic instability Turkey invaded
the
island in 1974 and partitioned Cyprus. UN "peacekeepers" have been there for
over
three decades now!
** Including the amazing provision that the whole of Sarajevo is to go to the
Croat-
Muslim side, ignoring the rights and aspirations of over 100,000 Serbs. All
previous
plans (Lisbon, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg, the Contact Group) had envisaged a
special status for the city, under international administration or supervision.
p. 2
The entrenched anti-Serb bias of the U.S. Administration has prevented
a truly even-handed deal, which would have left all three sides equally
dissatisfied. If the Serbs had been guaranteed at least an international formula
for Sarajevo as a truly "multiethnic" city, they could have had some stake in
the
resulting Bosnian order. As it is, they do not have any such stake, and
evidently
were not intended to have one. This is perceived by many analysts as an
additional source of weakness:
"The way the whole Dayton package has been put together reflects the
short-termism of this presidency, and its ultimate preference for PR over
substance. It may hold long enough to help Clinton get reelected, but it
will not survive in the long term: the inherent dynamics of Bosnia's
disintegration are still there. Those same centrifugal forces which had
doomed Yugoslavia as a whole are still present in Bosnia, probably even
more than before the U.S. got involved." (2)
So the Bosnian Serbs are "the big losers", as Richard Hollbrooke
triumphantly declared when it was all over. This was achieved not by diplomacy,
but by NATO air power in August and September, following the Markale II bomb-
stunt in Sarajevo. As a leading opposition figure in Belgrade put it, in a way
it
was the U.S. Air Force that did Milosevic's dirty work for him - by not only
breaking the spine of Mladic's army, but also by making it materially impossible
for Dr Karadzic and his political leadership to stand up to Belgrade!
Milosevic's
main objective had always been to neutralise any real or potential rivals, and
in
his destruction of Karadzic the downfall of the Bosnian-Serb republic is
coincidental. (3)
If it is accepted that President Milosevic does not follow any "Serb"
agenda, his Machiavellian pragmatism in the sell-out first of the Krajina and
then
the Bosnian Serbs makes perfect sense. "By signing whatever is presented to
him he is hoping to turn himself into an American asset. There will be an
American airfield in Tuzla, and an airfield in Skopje, and a naval base in
southern
Albania, come what may, and even if, one day, someone like Oskar Lafontaine
terminates the American connection, these assets will be there to stay." (4)
Even
though many Washington insiders would deny that there is a "grand design" in
Clinton's policy, it appears perfectly plausible that Dayton is not only about
American "leadership" within the North Atlantic alliance, but also about the
U.S.
preparing its European bridgehead if the Alliance's European partners decide
that they can manage WITHOUT the United States.
Deliberately or incrementally, it is along the arc of the Balkans that
the
United States is creating a long-term military and political presence in Europe
which is all its own, regardless of any temporary formula involving NATO.
Milosevic wants to be an active player in the emerging Pax Americana in that
part of the world, even if that means reducing "Serbia-proper" to the ridiculous
boundaries of the old Belgrade Pashaluk of 150 years ago. But supporting his
ambition is a short-sighted strategy for the United States: in order to prevent
chronic revanchism blighting the Balkans for decades to come, an economically
collapsed, sanctions-drained Serbia would need more of a "carrot" than
Milosevic's readmission into the club. Backing his autocratic neocommunism in
order to promote "stability" (read: unconditional Serb surrender) is worthy of
Clinton and Holbrooke, but not of serious diplomacy.
In conclusion, the fundamental weakness of Dayton is that it is not about
Bosnia, but about other considerations: President Clinton's reelection, the
future
of NATO, America's "leadership" and U.SD. geostrategic presence in Europe,
Milosevic's indefinite hold on power in Serbia etc.
2. Political basis of the Yugoslav conflict
Since other actors' motives in the Balkans are not about the Balkans, a
brief reexamination of the internal, "Yugoslav" sources of the present conflict
becomes necessary. This takes us back at least to the end of the Great War.
When the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came in 1918, it was at
least half-century overdue: had it happened at the time of Bismarck's and
Mazzini's unification projects, it could have worked. By the time of Versailles
the
process of separate cultural development and creation of separate national
identities among the South Slavs had been almost completed. Yugoslavia thus
came into being as a 19th-century dream which fitted uneasily into the realities
of post-1918 Europe.
The speedy collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941, and the ensuing four-
year horror, should have been a strong warning to the Serbs that the state was
fundamentally flawed and unviable. The most traumatic legacy of the Axis
occupation was the massacre which Croat and Bosnian Muslim Quislings
systematically perpetrated against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. What has
happened in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991-1995 cannot be understood without
taking account of the Ustasa "policy of racial purification that went even
beyond
Nazi practices". (5) The legacy of Croatian mini-Fuehrer Pavelic's reign of
terror
is a contemporary political fact of life par excellence, just as the Holocaust
is for
the Jews.
p. 3
Yugoslavia's flawed foundations notwithstanding, the immediate roots of
today's tragic conflict are primarily to be found in Josip Broz's autocratic
brand of
communism. Tito had devised in his lifetime a political system designed to
perpetuate his personal power by keeping Communist Party hierarchies in the
republics of Yugoslavia permanently at odds with each other. His system
assured Yugoslavia's slide into disintegration and civil war. There were
ultimately no "winners" in Tito's one-man state, but it is evident that he
treated
the Serbs with particularly vindictive disdain. The obvious, and ultimately the
most pernicious proof of this legacy concerns the internal boundaries among
SFRY's former republics.
Here we come to the key issue in the present conflict. The Serbs had
lived in one state since 1918, when the unified state of South Slavs came into
being. What guaranteed the escalation of Yugoslavia's conflict into war was the
attempt of breakaway republics to force over two million of them to become
minorities, literally overnight. They reacted, and often overreacted. The
principle
of territorial integrity of the republics fatally clashed with the principle of
self-
determination of the people.
Such curious insistence of German politicians and diplomats, in
particular, on keeping Tito's internal borders intact in 1991-92 proved fatal.
There could have been no objection to the striving of Croats and Bosnian
Muslims to create their own states. But equally there could have been no
justification for forcing over two million Serbs west of the Drina river to be
incorporated into those states, as their right to self-determination was as
valid as
that of any other group.* While routinely described as "aggressors", the Serbs
of
Bosnia and Krajina have been those regions' native population for centuries.
This begs the fundamental question of the entire Bosnian war: if the
collapse of Yugoslavia was due to the allegedly insurmountable contradictions
between its ethnic groups, is not Bosnia even less a viable state? Are not the
divergent interests among its ethnic groups even more strongly pronounced?
The advocates of a "multiethnic" Bosnia have never satisfactorily answered the
objection that their arguments are in effect also the arguments for the
reintegration of Yugoslavia, and that their objections to such reintegration are
also the arguments against Bosnia's viability.
In conclusion: however "irrational" the war in the Balkans may appear to
an outside observer, its political roots are fairly clear. Since Yugoslavia came
together as a union of nations in 1918, and not as an association of states - or
quasi-states - its present "divorce" should have reflected this fact. The right
of
self-determination of its constituent nations remains more valid than the
alleged
right of former federal units (republics) to keep their internal administrative
boundaries intact as international frontiers. The fact that history, law and
morality
have been overlooked by several major players deserves closer scrutiny.
3. Motives of American and European Policy
Persons unfamiliar with the American political scene may wonder what is
the motive for the U.S. to disregard all such arguments, eminently reasonable in
themselves, and to insist on forcing the trans-Drina Serbs to submit to the rule
of
their enemies - or accept mass exodus, such as the cleansing of the Krajina last
August. On scrutiny, the motives of this anti-Serb stance in Washington appear
not to be rooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeed any
higher moral principle.
The roots of U.S. policy have no basis in the Wilsonian legacy of the law
of nations, or in the notions of truth or justice, although they are concealed
behind
moralistic rhetoric. They are the end-result of the interaction of pressure
groups
within the American power structure. U.S. foreign policy in general, and
"Bosnian" policy in particular, reflects those groups' concern for their
particular
interests and global policy objectives.
There are two key strategic goals of American foreign policy today. One
is that the U.S. retain its role as the perceived leader of the "international
community". The other is that America remain the foremost economic power in
the world. (6) Specifically, Bosnia is useful for the US to make up to its oil
partners for four decades of strong support of Israel, and to show to its
middle-
eastern allies that the US is not inherently anti-Muslim. These objectives are
likely to continue to dominate American foreign policy thinking for the
foreseeable future, regardless of whether Bill Clinton or Bob Dole is in the
White
House.
_______________________
footnote to p. 3
* In 1989-90 the idea of an all-Yugoslav referendum on the future of the state
was
rejected. It was said that this would lead to the imposition of the will of a
majority
over the minority: the Serbs should not force the Croats and Slovenes to stay
within
Yugoslavia simply by outvoting them And yet, in Bosnia, international
recognition
was based on a simple majority (under 60% of the electorate!) voting for
independence. The Serbs, a third of Bosnia's population, and a majority in over
a half
of its territory, were excluded from this decision. Their aspirations were
bypassed in
exactly the way that was deemed unacceptable and unfair to the Croats and
Slovenes. How would the world react if the Flamish majority in Belgium - also
some
60% of the population - voted in a referendum that Belgium should join the
Netherlands, against the wishes of the Waloons?
p. 4
A side effect of this new approach has been to turn the war in the
Balkans from "a Yugoslav disaster and a European inconvenience" into a major
test of U.S. "leadership". This was made possible by a bogus consensus which
passed for "Europe's" Balkan policy. Beneath the surface there remained
streams of disagreement, although the political language was that of agreement
and the consensual judgment of violent events. This European consensus,
projected (and 'moralised') in the media, effectively limited the scope for
bringing
underlying disagreements into the open:
The effective motive for the mind-numbing celebration of consensus is
that every leader wishes to be a sort of world senator with an entree to the
highest of High Councils whether they be EC, NATO or UN. Little countries
still count for little, but they do have votes which are not strictly worthless.
Danish and Belgian soldiers patrol hills once thought unworthy of the bones of
a single Pomeranian grenadier. The New Europe cannot agree on as much
as it pretends, but its political culture requires deference to majority
opinion.
This makes a powerful force out of what may be called the lowest common
denominator. (7)
Western Europe's post-nationalists (new Germany's decision-making
elites always excepted) thought that they had a few real interests to defend in
the Balkans, so they avoided making discordant noises. This played into
Clinton's hands. "Europe" was not capable of resisting the new thrust of Bosnian
policy coming from Washington. While the Europeans mastered the lowest
common denominator in lieu of coherent policy, a virulently anti-Serb, agenda-
driven form of Realpolitik started dominating America's Bosnian policy by early
1994. Instead of the presumed Wilsonian moralist approach (however
misguided), egotistic unilateralism had suddenly grown rampant in Washington.
Globalist phraseology and rhetoric notwithstanding, "the intent is no longer to
achieve a consensus; it is to force others to acquiesce to the American
position."(8)
4. Effects of Bonn's Balkan policy on EU and Washington's on NATO
The new thrust in Washington has contributed to the continuation of the
war in the Balkans, just as Germany's unilateral push for the recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia had made matters worse two years earlier. Furthermore,
just as Germany sought to paint its Maastricht Diktat on recognition in December
1991 as an expression of the "European consensus", after December 1993
Washington's faits accomplis were straight-facedly labeled by the Administration
"the will of the international community".
There is still no coherent mainstream explanation as to why Germany
ventured to make this breakthrough regarding recognition. Instead of being
scrutinised in geopolitical terms, the foreign policy coming out of Bonn is
apparently treated as almost accidental, based on subjective, "cultural" whims,
something irrational, and thus liable chiefly to moral criticism. And yet, there
is
more than meets the eye: with the breakthrough in December 1991, the
strategists in Bonn enhanced the authority of Germany in international politics
in
an eminently 19th century manner. The other European countries - notably
Britain - sought to curb such assertiveness, but dared not do it in an equally
19th-century manner.*
Just as the EU has lived with the consequences of its acquiescence to
Herr Genscher's fist-banging in December 1991, NATO has felt the brunt of the
new American foreign policy approach.** In the Balkans the Europeans - notably
Lord Owen - have been repeatedly frustrated by American refusal to seek
consensus. (9) Several NATO partners were resentful but helpless when the
United States resorted to covert action - with the support of Turkey and Germany
- to smuggle arms into Croatia and Bosnia in violation of UN resolutions. (10)
Bill Clinton's primary foreign policy goals - promoting American
"leadership"
and economic strength - help explain his unwillingness to support pre-1994
initiatives
aimed at ending the war (Lisbon, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg), and his
unilateral actions to directly aid the Muslim and Croat cause. The end-product
was the Dayton deal, with all of its inherent flaws outlined above.
________________________________
footnotes to p.4
* The need for an ideological standpoint was purely coincidental: the myth about
the
Serbs as enemies, who were endlessly accused of expansionism and an inclination
towards communism (in addition to being routinely demonsed in a manner which
would be the envy of Dr Goebbels) was a form of moral "collateral damage" in the
process of Germany's redescovery of its leadership in Europe.
** Some NATO nations are understandably worried about Clinton's determination to
force the alliance into accepting rapid expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe;
and
yet, as Hatchett (op.cit.) points out, the Republican alternative is even more
grim, if
the leading contender for nomination is to be regarded as the opponent of the
incumbent. Far from attacking Clinton's recklessness, Senator Bob Dole derides
it for
not being tough enough. Especially disturbing is his contention that "the
geopolitical
rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet communism" and that
"Russian imperialism" remains a threat to US. interests.
p. 5
It has been stated that Clinton's desire to lead may explain why any
eventual agreement on Bosnia had to be on American terms, but it does not
explain why the American terms favored the Muslims. A Washington insider put
it bluntly in the early days of the conflict:
"The simple facts are these: we are getting incredible pressure form the
Saudis and others to help the Muslim cause in Bosnia. They remind us
that the Islamic world provides us with all the oil we want at relatively
low prices, that Islamic states have billions of petrodollars to invest in
"friendly states" and offer a potential market of over one billion people
for the goods and services of "friendly countries"; and finally, that the
peace process between Israel and the Islamic world would go better if
Israel's main friend was also a friend to Islamic countries. When you
weigh these facts against what eight million Serbs can do for
America's interests, its clear what direction our policy is going to
take."(11)
If anything, the American commitment to the Islamic connection seems
to be growing stronger, and the U.S. support of the Bosnian Muslims is part of
the implementation of this plan. (12) They claim that the US perceives its
hegemony in the Islamic world to be key to offsetting the geopolitical power of
a
united western Europe, an economically emerging China, and a natural
resource-rich Russia.
5. The Russian role
In view of Clinton's agenda and Dole's aggressiveness, it is essential to
consider the role of Russia in the Balkan equasion. For years this role was
virtually non-existent: Kozyrev went along with the policy of Washington and
Bonn in former Yugoslavia, often to the utter exasperation of other elements in
the Russian power structure.* (13) The Croat attack on the Krajina in August
1995, carried out with the connivance of Washington, and the subsequent NATO
bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, have effected a deep change in
Moscow. There is a growing realisation of long-term implications of the Yugoslav
end-game for the Russians. If the US was able to dictate terms for a Bosnian
settlement at Dayton last November, they say, "we can expect that it soon will
attempt to dictate solutions to problems such as Chechnya, Crimea, and other
issues lingering from the dissolution of the USSR". This could result in renewed
cold war that could easily turn hot.
Former Yugoslavia in general, and the predicament of the Serb
nation in particular, is the test-case of Russia's relations with the western
world for decades to come. Its token participation in IFOR notwithstanding,
Russia remains fundamentally opposed to the method of introduction of this
U.S.-led NATO force. Quite apart from the obvious impossibility of IFOR being
"fair" and "impartial", it is stressed in Moscow that its presence on the Drina
creates a precedent which may lead to the establishment of NATO bases in
Latvia, Estonia or the Ukraine. It is suspected that there have always been
people in Washington and Bonn - such as Senator Dole! - who regarded
"Russia", rather than "the Soviet Union", as the enemy.
Both academic experts and policy planners in Moscow suspect that
IFOR ultimately would be used not to "keep peace", but to enforce whatever is
agreed between the Muslims and Washington. They see that similar suspicions
are increasingly heard in the United States itself, at congressional hearings
and
in the media. Quite apart from the papered-over issue of the chain of command
for participating Russian forces, it is the view of Moscow that the Security
Council has to reassert its presently purely notional authority over IFOR. The
real test will be the withdrawal deadline at the end of this year.
Moscow is beginning to understand that the United States will continue
to place its leadership position in western Europe above considerations of
improved relations with Russia. America knows that NATO is the only European
organization the US can control. For NATO to be viable, the US believes that it
must look for new missions and new membership. From a legal standpoint, there
is no justifiable reason for NATO to be in Bosnia at the present time.
Conversely, there is every reason for the OCSE to be there. By expanding
NATO the U.S. hopes to expand the ranks of supporters for a strong American
role in Europe. After Kozyrev, the Russians will have to re-explore political
reality in the big wide world.
_______________________________
footnote to p. 5
* "The former foreign minister is now universally condemned in Moscow not so
much
for having failed in Bosnia (and regarding the issue of NATO expansion) but for
not
having tried. Even his previous supporters accept that Kozyrev has failed to
establish
where Russia stands in the new international order. He has foisted on Russia an
ideological policy which has become the more duplicitous the more it has failed.
After Kozyrev, the Russians will have to re-explore political reality in the big
wide
world". (14)
p. 6
Conclusions
As a native of the Balkans I would like to see peace and justice done in
my part of the world, not in the name of ethnic particularism, but in the name
of
common decency and long-term stability in Europe. As a friend of America I too
would like to see the world's most powerful country be an effective world
leader.
Dayton leaves me unhappy on both counts. It is a temporary expedient, neither
just nor durable, imposed by an American administration which is displaying not
leadership, but thuggery. The bottom line from Dayton leaves no room for
triumphalism in any but Croat-Moslem quarter. Croatia, in particular, is the
winner in a war which should have left all sides equally dissatisfied. Excessive
satisfaction for any other belligerent ensures a new round some years, or
decades, down the road...
Four years into an unprecedented campaign of villification of the Serbs
Europe is now reaping its consequences: The largest ethnic cleansing of the
entire war -- the expulsion of a quarter of a million Serbs from the Krajina
region
overrun by the Croats last August -- is a topic virtually unmentioned in any
news
forum. The same applies to the fact that the Serbs presently constitute the
largest refugee population anywhere outside sub-Saharan Africa.
When the Yugoslav war was breaking out, back in 1991
and 1992 the Serbs knew that Croatian and then Bosnian independence - with
the irresponsibly hasty recognition of these two Yugoslav republics by the West
-
would lead to experiences not dissimilar to the genocide they experienced at the
hands of Croat and Moslem Quislings in 1941-45. They often overreacted, but
essentially they were right to be apprehensive. Their arguments and anxieties
have remained unreported or misrepresented. They do not suspect, they know
that, overwhelmingly, the media has been partial to the Moslems and the Croats.
Having had its own peace plans constantly torpedoed by Washington for
over two years, Europe has ended up as an indirect sponsor of ethnic cleansing
by letting its pilots be used by Admiral Smith as the Bosnian-Moslem Air Force,
and its gunners on Mt Igman as the Bosnian-Moslem artillery last summer. This
has enabled the Croat-Moslem army to drive an additional two-hundred-
thousand Serb civilians from western Bosnia in a massive offensive in
September. Dayton has effectively sealed their fate, too; to quote an American
journalist, "it may be hailed as Clinton's triumph, I'd call it electioneering;
term it a
policy option if you will, but don't confuse it with justice."
A "new Balkan order" which would satisfy, albeit temporarily, the
aspirations of virtually all ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, except some
nine
million Serbs, is a disastrous strategy for all concerned. Even if forced into
submission now, the Serbs would have no stake in the ensuing order of things.
This would cause imbalance and strife for years, or decades.
References:
1. John Hillen, "Questioning the Bosnia Peace Plan", The Heritage
Foundation, Washington DC, November 30, 1995
2. BBC World Service TV News, 07:30GMT, Friday, 24 November 1995
3. Dr Vojislav Kostunica, President of the Democratic Party of Serbia, to the
author,
November 1995
4. Dr Srdja Trifkovic, The Lord Byron Lecture, Moscow State University, 4
October 1995
5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition (1991), Macropaedia, Vol. 29, p. 1111
6. Dr Ronald Hatchett, "Bosnia and the American Foreign Policy Agenda"
(unpublished conference paper), Russian Academy of Science/The Lord
Byron Foundation International Conference on former Yugoslavia,
Moscow, January 1996
7. Dr Michael Stenton," The Lowest Common Denominator in Yugoslavia",
The Lord Byron Foundation paper, 10/94
8. Hatchett, op.cit.
9. "Clinton Prolonged the War, Owen Says," Reuters, December 22, 1993; also
see
Lord Owen's interview, BBC TV, "Panorama", November 1995.
10. cf. eg. "Saudi says U.S. joined in war aid to Bosnians", International
Herald
Tribune, February 3-4, 1996
11. Hatchett, op.cit.
12. cf. Jacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind, The Third American Empire,
The New York Times, December 30, 1995
13. cf. eg. Professor Yelena Gusskova, The Serbian Question and late-20th
Century
Europe (unpublished conference paper), Russian Academy of Science/The Lord
Byron Foundation International Conference on former Yugoslavia, Moscow,
January 1996
14. The Lord Byron Foundation, Report on Mission to Moscow, October 1995