Article by the "Research Team" of SLOBODNA BOSNA: "Who Rules Bosnia and in Which Way?"
[FBIS Translated Text] SLOBODNA BOSNA has come into
possession of two very confidential documents which the U.S.
intelligence service, in cooperation with the services of
some other Western countries, recently sent to its
government in Washington. The same materials went to the
German Government in Bonn. The documents were entitled
"Report on the Phenomena of Mafia in the Bosniak leadership
and the Circles of Power in the Part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Controlled by Bosniaks" and the "Temporary Report on the
Movement 'Young Muslims.'" According to the U.S. sources
used by SLOBODNA BOSNA, these reports were sent this summer
from the office of the U.S. intelligence service situated in
Zagreb. Similar reports were made about the situation on the
territories under control of the HVO [Croat Defense
Council], and the Army of Bosnian Serbs. These reports,
unfortunately, are not available to SLOBODNA BOSNA at this
moment, but we are impatiently awaiting them.
At the beginning of this report which SLOBODNA BOSNA
possesses, it is stated that the leaders of all three sides
used the war situation for their private business. Croats
charged illegal customs and taxes on the roads through
western Herzegovina, Serbs traded with oil via the otherwise
closed border with Serbia, and Bosniaks, as is stated,
misused the difficult situation in the cities of central
Bosnia. All three sides traded with human lives, it is said.
Mafia in the Bosniak Leadership
The story about the dirty affairs of the Bosniak
political leadership starts with the analysis of the
connections of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Islamic countries.
Further, the report states:
"Of course some Islamic countries are Bosnian friends,
but not the big friends as they wish to present themselves.
Some of those countries have a lot of interest here, and
that is the main reason why they support the Bosnian
Government. Just like in any other state, in Islamic
countries there is no money which is given away just like
that, with no return. The 'credits' which the Islamic
countries gave to the Bosniaks must be repaid. There are two
ways to do that: either with money or with accepting
ideology. As a poor state which has just come out of a war,
Bosnia cannot pay with money, but it can pay by accepting
ideology. That is why Bosnia has accepted their religious
and military instructors...."
At the beginning of the war, Bosniaks depended on the
help from Islamic countries. They were without food, money,
or weapons. The international community was deaf and blind
to their requests, and Islamic countries used that and
increased their influence in the Balkans. The so-called
Iranian connection started functioning. When the war
started, President Alija Izetbegovic called his old friend
Dr. al-Fatih Ali al-Hassan, who was a clerk at the Sudanese
Embassy in Zagreb at that time. Dr. al-Fatih started
collecting money from Islamic countries for a new
humanitarian organization TWRA [expansion unknown].
President Izetbegovic authorized Hasan Cengic (who at the
time was an imam of the mosque in Zagreb) to manage the
money from the account of TWRA and transfer it to Bosnia.
All the money was transferred to the SDA [Party of
Democratic Action] or to the logistics center of the Bosnian
Army in Visoko.
The logistics center in Visoko was administered by
Halid Cengic (Hasan's father). Hasan Cengic later returned
from Zagreb to Visoko, and worked together with his father.
At the beginning of this year Hasan was appointed deputy
minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
From this position, Cengic could control the work of the
minister of defense Vladimir Soljic (hard-line HDZ
representative), as well as the future arming of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croat Defense Council] within
the program "Equip and Train." The Cengic family controlled the Ministry of Defense--
even before Hasan's appointment -through their cousin
Muhamed Lemes, who at that time was deputy to the minister
of defense, Hamdija Hadzihasanovic, who had been appointed
by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. President Izetbegovic and
the Cengic family appointed Lemes as the deputy minister.
The real leader of this ministry at the time was Lemes.
Halid Cengic had been a member of the organization "Young
Muslims." He was in prison together with Izetbegovic,
Nedzib Sacirbegovic, and Dr. al-Fatih. Although he is
renowned among the Bosniak leadership, he is not very well
known in the public. He is a man who stays in the shadows
but is very influential. He comes from eastern Bosnia, and
before the war he worked as a storage keeper in Ustikolina.
Before the war, Halid's son Hasan organized the
financing of paramilitary forces of the SDA called
"Patriotic League" and was known as "minister for logistic
and minister for Iran." He distributed the weapons from
Zagreb to the mosques throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hasan
Cengic established good relations with Dr. al-Fatih, and
before his arrival to Bosnia-Herzegovina he linked him up
with his successors in Zagreb, Salim Sabic and the
Sahinpasic family (both families originate from eastern
Bosnia).
The information on Salim Sabic is rather scarce. The
only confirmed one is that Fikret Abdic accused him of being
a secret agent of KOS [Yugoslav intelligence service]. Salim
Sabic was even tried because of that, but, it seems
President Izetbegovic stopped it. The Sahinpasic family is
known to be very rich and influential. They have a bank in
Zagreb, and one member of the family is a delegate in the
Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also possess a
company which, among others, published Izetbegovic's books.
In 1993 Omer Behmen (ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina
to Iran), Dr. al-Fatih, Hasan Cengic, and Salim Sabic tried
to open a bank in Vienna. Austrian authorities prevented it.
There are rumors that the mentioned group went to Vienna
with bags in which there were millions of U.S. dollars.
The Bosniak lobby was well organized in Europe and in
the United States. The main organizations through which
their work was performed were the committees of the SDA and
"Merhamet" [charity society], embassies of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the so-called Bosnian Club, which is
completely Muslim-oriented. The main man of the Bosniak
lobby in the West is Teufik Velagic (he was a member of
"Young Muslims," emigrated in 1950 and lives in Vienna), and
for the United States, the Sacirbegovic family. These
persons are on top of the pyramid and have people in every
corner of the world.
Main Bosses in the Regions
The region of Gorazde was controlled by Hadzo Efendic
who was not popular among the local population because of
private exchanges of people with the Serbs. Our sources from
that town claim that he did not do anything about the
defense of the town, and that he mostly sat in the cellar
and from time to time sent reports to Sarajevo about the
difficult situation of Gorazde. Because of the
dissatisfaction of the citizens of Gorazde, President
Izetbegovic moved him to Sarajevo, where he was deputy prime
minister for a time, and was then appointed ambassador,
first in Vienna and then in Bern. It is interesting that
Hadzo Efendic does not speak any foreign languages, and,
according to our source, the embassy in Vienna worked only
for Bosnian Muslims. After Hadzo Efendic, the leading
position in Gorazde was taken over by Rijad Rascic, cousin
of the Cengic family and a hard-line SDA representative.
Rijad Rascic controls everything in the Gorazde Canton.
The region of Tuzla is controlled by the governor of
the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton, Izet Hadzic (very close to
Izetbegovic). He was born in Kalesija, came to Tuzla at the
beginning of the war, did not do anything for the defense of
this city, and is not very popular among the local
population. In Tuzla problems started with the establishment
of the canton some 20 months ago. The cantonal government
first illegally occupied several buildings in Tuzla,
throwing their owners out. Then national problems started,
of which earlier there were none in this region. Croats
asked to form their municipality, Serbs were terrified and
thrown out, the government brought in rural population from
eastern parts to Tuzla, and so on. The cantonal government
also formed the local television with strong one-national
and religious propaganda. An initiative for the removal of
Izet Hadzic was started a year ago, but until this day there
have been no personnel changes in this canton.
The Bihac region is controlled by the Veladzic family.
President of the canton Mirsad Veladzic is a brother-in-law of the Cengic family. The Veladzic family originates from
the village of Veladzici in the surroundings of Bihac, and it is very rich. During the war Mirsad Veladzic earned a lot
of money, which is the reason that he is also not popular among the local population. He has the entire power and
controls everything that happens in this canton. In the post
of minister of internal affairs of this canton Mirsad
Veladzic put his close relative through whom he controls the
situation in this area. Veladzic is very close to
Izetbegovic and a known radical in the SDA. Momentarily his
main concern is to populate the liberated towns around Bihac (Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, Sanski Most, Bosanska Krupa). It
is interesting that Veladzic does not populate this
territory with citizens who come from these places, but
mostly with the population from Sandzak and eastern Bosnia
(Srebrenica and Zepa). He claims that these people are
brought in only temporarily, but it seems that that is the
official policy of creating ethnically clean territories.
The region of Zenica is under total control of the
Cengic family and their Visoko-based lobby. Military control
is in the hands of Brigadier Dzemal Merdan (known to CIA
from before because of his connections with Iran). Zenica
and the entire region of central Bosnia were completely
militarized in the first two years of the war. The region of
Zenica was under strong control and terrorism of "mujahidin"
(local and foreign). The local police were not able to
protect people or owners of small firms from the
"paramilitary" formations which took everything from them
(both money and goods). Nobody knows in whose pocket that
money ended up.
The most influential and the most radical Bosniak
leaders come from Tesanj. For example, Mirsad Ceman is a
known radical and one of the five people who rule the SDA.
Another person, who also comes from Tesanj, is Halid Genjac,
who replaced Silajdzic in the post of the vice president of
the SDA. The third important family from this town is> Ljevakovic. Zijad [Ljevakovic] controls the Muslim cultural
association "Preporod" and his cousin Irfan Ljevakovic
[controls] the secret police AID [Agency for Investigation
and Documentation]. For the first three years [of the war]
Irfan Ljevakovic worked in the Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in Vienna (this led to his connection with Dr. al-Fatih and
TWRA). Irfan Ljevakovic is very close to President
Izetbegovic, and he enjoys his full trust. As for other
persons among influential Bosniaks, Bakir Alispahic is
interesting; he was put in the post of minister of internal
affairs at the initiative of Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, leading
figure of Bosniak policy, who is interesting, but no longer
so influential as some institutions (for example, CIA) used
to believe. Alispahic was appointed at the time when
Mahmutcehajic was the informal adviser to President
Izetbegovic. There are rumors that Alispahic traded with
passports and drugs, carried out private exchanges of people
with the Serb side and so on, but this information is not
confirmed.
The "Young Muslims" Dossier
In the report on the phenomena of mafia, the conclusion
is that most political ideas of the present leaders of the
SDA can be found in the documents and activities of the
organization "Young Muslims," to which the second report was
fully devoted. Among others, the following can be read about
the predecessors of the SDA in this report:
The "Young Muslims" movement was formed by a group of
students and pupils gathered around in an Islamic club in
Sarajevo on the eve of World War II (1939). The religiously
and nationally oriented students were dissatisfied with the
existing political organizations which were incapable of
protecting Muslim interests. Their political program is
unclear, but it can be noted that they were the followers of
the general political ideas of Mehmed Spaho. Their strategic
interest was the protection of Islam and of the Muslim
identity in the Balkans.... They were never officially
registered. The informal leader of the organization in that
period was Tarik Muftic, who initiated the constitutional
assembly of this organization in March of 1941. Other
distinguished members of this organization from the so-
called Zagreb group were: Husref Basagic, Emin Granov, Esad
Karadjozovic, etc.
The general attitude of "Young Muslims" towards the
Islamic community at that time was negative. "Young Muslims"
believed that the "class of imams" was not capable of
reaffirming Islamic values because it was burdened with
formalism and rigid attitudes towards the present. Despite
that, some members of the organization remained in touch
with the religious authorities, particularly through the
organizations "El-Hidaja" and "Merhamet," which were under
the auspices of the Islamic community....
Attitudes Toward Ustashas, Communists, and the SDA
As the followers of Spaho's policy, "Young Muslims"
were fully aware of the intentions of Serbs and Croats
concerning Muslims. This and other factors influenced their
reserved attitudes towards the authorities of the NDH
[Independent State of Croatia in World War II]. Statements
and other evidence confirm that they were not connected with
the Ustasha regime although they were tolerated by Pavelic's
administration because they did not openly oppose it and
because the official Croatian attitude was that Muslims were
a part of Croatian ethnic and political corpus. According to
official sources, there is not one member of "Young Muslims"
who became a state official in Pavelic's government or a
soldier of any SS unit. (Some of them were members of
"Ustasha Youth," an organization which was obligatory for
all students.) Moreover, most "Young Muslims" were
recruited in the civil protection ['domobrani'] units from
which they deserted during the war. In the course of 1943,
NDH authorities arrested "Young Muslims" accusing them of
cooperation with partisans. However, after interventions,
mostly from the Islamic community, they were soon released.
Concerning the communist regime, at the beginning it
did not treat "Young Muslims" as enemies of the regime, or
as a quisling formation, despite their clear anticommunism.
Yet, during 1949, out of political reasons (in the intention
to find collaborators of the Third Reich, NDH, Chetniks, and
so on, among all Yugoslav national groups) communists chose
"Young Muslims," at that time a political organization of
minor influence, as counterparts to Chetniks and Ustashas. A
number of actions were undertaken with the purpose of
eventing their cooperation with any noncommunist political
organization. The authorities decided that "Young Muslims"
would be the organization through which they would discredit
and remove from political life the leading Muslim> politicians. "Young Muslims" were accused of cooperation
with occupiers, particularly Germany and NDH, the for
"creating units of Gestapo and other intelligence agencies,"
they were called "products of Pavelic's regime," counterrevolutionary forces which got instructions from the
West to use the conflict between Tito and Stalin, and so
on....
Unintentionally, the communist regime did a favor for
"Young Muslims," which, from a marginal political
organization with several hundred members, became a symbol
of resistance to communism, a symbol of sacrifice for
national goals, and so on. A group of politically naive
students--far from serious political ideas like, for
example, the idea of sovereign Bosnia--was sent to prison
for many years, where they politically matured, in
accordance with the communist doctrine that "there is no
better university like the one in prison."
As a political party, the SDA ideologically originates
from the movement "Young Muslims." This can be seen already
on the basis of comparison of attitudes towards Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Both organizations see Bosnia-Herzegovina as
the necessary frame for the protection of national identity.
Because of inimical neighborhood, Bosnia-Herzegovina should
develop as a state in which Muslims dominate, and in which
other national and religious groups will be tolerated. Both
organizations restrain from the use of force in carrying out
their plans.
The SDA differs from the "Young Muslims" only with
regard to the name of the nation. Because of political
circumstances it was decided that the name Muslims be
changed to Bosniaks, although the SDA, from 1990 to 1993,
was persistent in refusing the name 'Bosniak' which was
proposed by the MBO (Muslim Bosniak Organization) and other
political organizations. The SDA refused that precisely
because of its "Young Muslims" heritage and religious ideas.
A possible political option of the SDA on forming a
mini-Bosniak republic could also be associated with the
attitudes of "Young Muslims." The hard line in the SDA is
willing to accept the reduced Bosnia with the purpose of
establishing Bosnia after "their" models (Iranian
connection)."
The report by the Western intelligence services, in which they analyze the power-holders in Bosnia-Herzegovina--
regardless of some serious material mistakes--doubtlessly
points to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus the
authorities in it, are subjects of highly serious and
ambitious observation by the "foreign factor." Some
qualifications and evaluations are disputable; however, what
is more disputable are the naive, amateur attempts of the
representatives of the regime to hide anything before a
numerous army of spies and intelligence people of
respectable experience and ambition.
