Almost at the same time, two books were published on the war in former Yugoslavia. The reports by American journalist Roy Gutman on "the most horrifying conflict in Europe since World War II" were awarded the 1993 Pulitzer Prize, and now can be read in German translation, under the title "Witnesses to Genocide".
The "Serbia Must Die" collection of texts published by Klaus Bittermann, includes items on the role of the Western media in this conflict. The judgment of these authors is that the media have been one-sidedly involved against the Serbs and from that angle produced a very distorted pieture on the war in the Balkans. In this respect, some also targeted Roy Gutman's reports.
Let us hope that "Serbia Must Die" represents a breakthrough in the debate on media bias in the war in Yugoslavia, which should have been achieved in Germany long ago. The condemnation of the Serbs as the sole aggressor was probably not as striking in any other Western country as it was in Germany. But, while this bias was publicly stigmatized elsewhere and a debate on these issues initiated, a general silence on this topic still prevails here. It is characteristic that the most important forum of this debate in German-speaking regions is not io be found in any German editorial board, but in the Swiss Die Weltwoche magazine. Therefore "Serbia Must Die " would do well to attract considerable attention in Germany.
In these 15 articles, many news reports on the war in Bosnia are exposed as being distorted or untrue. Peter Brock's article "Thc Partisan Press" is an example in that respect. First published in the American Foreign Policy magazine, this article is considered to have provoked a debate on the quality of Western reporting on the Balkans. Some of Brock's allegations proved later to be inaccurate - and therefore this article ought be approached with caution. Still he gives numerous examples of scarce and equivocal sources being used as material for front-page headlines. There is the example of John Burns, editor of The New York Times, who interviewed a Serbian soldier from Bosnia in a Muslim prison. This man talked to him in detail about the atrocities allegedly committed by him and other Serbs. Although many of Burns's colleagues think that this witness ought not to be trusted much, Burns won fame with him. In 1993, together with Roy Gutman, he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his reports.
An interesting view of "superficial journalism" is also given by Martin Lettmayer from the Spiegel TV. He traced the stories on alleged mass rapes that were particularly popular in journalistic circles. He investigated the story about a certain Serbian "war criminal" who together with his wife allegedly maintained a brothel in which women were forced into prostitution, launched into the world by Die Tageszeitung reporter Erich Rathfelder in his intervicw with the director of the Center for the Investigation of War Crimes in Zenica. Lettmayer conducted an on-the-spot investigation and, regardless of all his efforts, found no proof for either this or the other accusations. One of the most embarrassing stories that casts a far from amicable light on the work of certain Western journalists is thc story by Zeljko Vukovic about a boy from Sarajevo. A certain Western television crew gave the boy a 10-mark bill to run across an intersection controlled by snipers. While running across for the eighth time, the boy was shot, clutching the corresponding number of bills.
In "Serbia Must Die" Lettmayer explains that at that time nobody would dare "to turn against public opinion". The reaction that those journalists who still dared had to contend with is described in the article by editor of the foreign column of the Die Weltwoche magazine, Hanspeter Born, who decided to publish "The Partisan Press", an article by Peter Brock, under this provocative title. He only narrowly succeeded in holding onto of his post. Born points out that some errors slipped by in Brock's article, and so does Roy Gutman in his article published in the "Forum" column of Foreign Policy, pointing to the deficiencies in Brock's research. Hanspeter Born, however, defends the message given by Brock, as well as his own decision to publish this article. In parentheses, however, he informs the reader that for a long time Die Weltwoche and his own editorial board had been publishing one-sided articles, depicting the Serbs as villains. Therefore, his plea today is not convincing, either.
"Serbia Must Die" makes very exciting reading when citing actual examples of erroneous information. The reader gains a certain notion about the irresponsible work of individual journalists, who subsequently manipulated public opinion in the West.
It is a big demerit, however, that this collection has neither a preface nor an introduction. Any reader not acquainted with the context of this debate about the media, and knowing nothing about Peter Brock, or about the controversy in Die Weltwoche and possibly being under the influence of the anti-Serbian climate prevailing in Gemmany, might therefore find it very difficult to follow this material. Another weakness is found in articles generating the impression that they are some sort of personal settling of scores between two groups that are at odd - the "bellicose" intellectuals demanding military intervention, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit and BemardHenri Levy - on one side, and authors inclined toward moderation on the other. Admittedly, these often cynically and polemically fommulated sections might receive a warm welcome from those well acquainted with the issues, but on the other hand, probably have a rather negative effect upon an unprepared reader.
"Serbia Must Die" lacks political analysis into which only a few authors timidly venture to enter. Admittedly, in his article "Warmongering Intellectuals", Klaus Bittermann fiercely criticizes Westem intellectuals who sided with the Bosnian Muslims and spread tendentious views. However, he touches only marginally on the important question of why these former "leftists" are the ones who are requesting Western military intervention to help the Muslims today. Among other things, he mentions "ensuring one's own importance" which, as many believe, can be achieved today only by "making the loudest noise". Such attempts at analysis are not, however, sufficiently elaborated.
Besides, it strikes the eye that on more than 200 pages there is not a single instance of a successful attempt to accurately relate media bias to the policy of Western govemments. Admittedly, it is clear that the anti-Serbian frame of mind in governmental circles frequently coincided with the pieture diffused in public by the media.
It is rightfully pointed out that an escalation of the war in former Yugoslavia was brought about only after the involvement of the West - for instance after Germany's unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. There is, however, no explanation as to why Western govemments intervened at all and why, for instance, Germany ventured to make this breakthrough regarding recognition. Consequently, the foreign policy coming out of Bonn gives the impression of being something accidental and based on subjective whims, something irrational, and therefore arouses chiefly moral criticism. In the final outcome, it is only underestimated; with this breakthrough, the strategists from Bonn were acting with the aim of enhancing the authority of Germany in international politics. The other European countries wanted to curb Germany's foreign affairs, and so they first endorsed the preservation of Yugoslavia. Later on, through their own initiative, they also tried to take the helm once more and score some points on the international scene. Actually, the Wcstern governments do not care much about the Balkans and the sufferings of the people living there - it is much more appropriate to say that these people are victims and toys in the hands of hostility and rivalry in the Western world.
In order to make their foreign policy aims closer to people, politicians needed an ideological standpoint and a myth about the Serbs as enemies who were attributed with expansionism and an inclination towards communism, in addition to being alleged demons. Hence it seems logical and explainable by foreign policy aims that, for instance, in Germany a very prominent anti-Serb orientation prevailed - aimed at justifying Germany's independent recognition of Croatia, while in Washington or London good relations with politicians from Belgrade were still maintained, and correspondingly, which is characteristic, the media gave a more balanced picture on the hostilities in the Balkans.
If the political intentions of the West's interventionist policy are taken into consideration, the media also appear in quite a different light. When somewhat simplified, it can be formulated in the following way: for different reasons, numerous journalists have simply allowed themselves to be put in the service of the interests of their governments. Consciously or unconsciously, certain intellectuals have assumed the role of spokesmen of the foreign ministries of their countries - partly out of a sheer misunderstanding of the course of events, or because they have been seduced by stories on the allegedly honourable and humane character of Western involvement, and also partly just because they identify with the aims of the national elite. It is no wonder that, for instance, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung sided with the CDU/CSU parties and, through Reismuller, promoted their views in a somewhat more radical form.
Admittedly , conspiratorial theories on omnipresent censure are no longer valid, but while reading "Serbia Must Die" one is surprised that a quite notorious fact is completely overlooked: that political parties and governments are abusing the media for their own aims not only in the Balkans, but in Germany as well. It would be interesting if one could have learned more from this book about how the political aims of governments are being diffused from the top downward in the media world, and thereby in the public opinion.
Zeljko Vukovic, however, gives a very good example, although he does not elaborate it. He recounts how the image of Slobodan Milosevic as the "cutthroat from the Balkans" started changing after his talks with Mitterand in Paris, and how the French media now write more often about the "first man of Serbia". How can this "collective change of direction" in the media be explained, if not by France's new strategy in the Balkans, which requires that the public be prepared using appropriate publicity.
In "Serbia Must Die", the connection between politics and the media is occasionally even turned completely upside down. Instead of being guided by their foreign policy aims, Western governments sometimes seem to be an almost pitiful clique, which is the prey of the "partisan press". Thus, the example of Reismuller from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is constantly being cited, as if his personal opinion on the Serbs was more competent for German foreign policy than the opinions of the strategists, Kohl and Kinkel. This view is expressed in the article by Thomas Fleiner, director of the Freiburg Institute for Federalism. He regrets that many heads of governments are "allowing their foreign policy decisions to be too influenced by the public opinion of their countries".