ROSENTHAL-COLUMN-NYT
By A.M. ROSENTHAL
c.1995 N.Y. Times News Service
From Bosnia and Washington now come almost daily official
reports on how the Western powers will learn and profit from the
military history of the years when the United Nations tried to keep
a nonexistent peace.
But one essential report never comes from Western officials: how
we can learn and profit from the political history that brought
about the war in the first place.
In that history lie the answers on how another Bosnia could be
avoided. Yet not one civilian leader talks about that history and
what is to be learned from it. They do not dare.
The politicians and diplomats of the West who shaped the history
through their own errors and failures are still in office. To
examine the past few years with honesty would damage them, and this
they will not consider.
Four times before the Bosnian war, the European Community
received direct warnings that they were about to make it
inevitable. Three of them came from representatives of the United
Nations the then-secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Lord
Carrington of Britain and Cyrus Vance, former secretary of state of
the United States. The fourth came from the man who is now
President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic.
The warning was to go slow. The West was told not to submit to
Germany's imperious demand for quick recognition of Croatia, its
World War II ally, which had broken away from the collapsing
Yugoslavia. If the West did, the Bosnian Muslims would be forced to
declare an independent Bosnia quickly. One-third of Bosnia's people
its Serbs would fight rather than be forced into this newly
created Bosnia, where they would feel denationalized and controlled
by Muslims and Croats they feared.
The Europeans, with the United States trotting along, ignored
the warnings, or the alternative of the de facto partition that is
the end result of the war.
War came. Two hundred thousand people died. About a million were
forced out of their homes and villages. Now Americans have landed
in Bosnia, something the United States never dreamed of when it
recognized the new nation.
What have we learned? Until we face the question, the answer is
``nothing.'' What could we learn if we do?
For one thing, before recognizing a new country, find out if the
would-be government is in control of the territory it claims. If
not, delay recognition and encourage concessions to the opposing
side or be ready to go in and fight for the new regime. The
Bosnian Muslims came to count on outside help to establish control
of the country a grievous error.
The lesson for people who want independence is to make
concessions that will persuade powerful minorities to live under
your roof, let them go their way, or be prepared to fight, alone.
Americans can learn that the use of air power leads to the use
of ground power. Believe that not politicians, military men or
journalistic bombardiers who assure you otherwise.
And Americans can learn that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has changed. It is supposed to bind its members to
mutual protection against attack its members, not the whole
world. Now NATO is sending heavy forces into a war that did not
involve an attack on any member, or a direct military threat.
Maybe Americans are thrilled at the change, maybe not. Neither
the Republicans nor the White House has spelled out the
consequences. Why should they, when Americans do not demand it?
In the Bosnian field, the best weapon American commanders have
is their own realization that no matter what officials back home
pretend, this is not an attempt to ``keep'' a peace. It is a
powerful military operation to enforce a peace that may or may not
come about as a result of a treaty demanded by the United States as
the condition for committing its troops.
That realization is the difference between sitting waiting to be
attacked, as the U.N. command did, and acting as commanders are
supposed to act: when in danger, strike first. The forces entrusted
to them will be the stronger and safer for the military lessons
their commanders learned from the past and the clarity of mind that
goes with it.
But the people of the United States and Europe will one day
suffer from the refusal of their governments to face the history
and lessons of Bosnia and their own failure to demand an
accounting.
<TDAT> NYT-12-21-95 1958EST
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